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Abstract 
In view of the critique of the methodology of the dominant interdisciplinary research involving language studies as 
the main component, in particular clinical linguistics, Cummings (Pragmatic disorders. Perspectives in pragmatics, 
philosophy and psychology, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht, 2014) proposes that “It is perhaps appropriate at this point to 
move the debate onto non-empirical grounds.” In Cummings (2014: 113) she starts such a debate on the grounds of 
the philosophy of language and pragmatics. In this article, I propose to expand that debate by including the input of 
the philosophy of science. I start the discussion by presenting the way one may carry out language research in the 
paradigm of empirical sciences from the perspective outlined in Bunge (Scientific research. Strategy and philosophy. 
Berlin, Springer, 1967; Method, model and matter (synthese library). D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1973; 
Emergence and convergence: qualitative novelty and the unity of knowledge. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
2003) and constrained by Altmann’s (Towards a theory of language. Glottometrica 1:1–25, 1978) assumption about 
self-originating and self-regulatory nature of language.
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Background
As it is becoming more and more common to study bio-
cognitive-social aspects of language, more and more 
researchers attempt to study language the way it is done 
in core empirical sciences. Yet, this is largely a descrip-
tive effort. As Cummings (2014: 113) warns, for instance 
in relation to clinical pragmatics, if current trends keep 
dominating, clinical pragmatics may “develop into a field 
that collects findings in the same way that the geologist 
collects rock samples or the botanist collects plant spe-
cies.” What differs today’s chemistry and biology from 
such a “pre-empirical” classificatory biology and the main 
stream contemporary linguistics is that many concepts in 
contemporary biology and chemistry have their measur-
able counterparts, and today’s typical biologist collects 
data also in an objective manner, posit hypothesis, and 
tests them using objective measuring techniques.
Note also, that in the process, the biologists have 
changed the questions they ask. They know that because 
of the contingencies involved, biology could not have 
predicted the existence of today’s elephants a million 
years ago, no more than it can predict the exact fea-
tures of a baby elephant that will be born to a specific 
female elephant. Yet, they may predict the likely range of 
parameters of the elephant to be born, and why the his-
tory of the environment  on the Earth allowed for mod-
ern day elephants to develop. General linguists, on the 
other hand, when for instance concerned with meaning, 
are still typically interested only in the interpretation of 
a specific linguistic construct, and not in any quantita-
tive parameters, which could be objectively measured 
and used to posit and test hypothesis. And, as Cummings 
(2009) complains, even in empirically oriented clinical 
pragmatics, there is “a proliferation of clinical findings 
with little sense of how these findings are related to each 
other or to theoretically significant questions. It is not 
an exaggeration to say that a relentless growth of clinical 
findings which are largely devoid of theoretical implica-
tions has been the dominant trend in clinical pragmatics 
to date.” Cummings (ibidem: 113) goes on to point out 
three pragmatic theories that are capable of modelling 
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clinical disorder processes—she notes, however, that “all 
three theories have succeeded in bringing forward exper-
imental evidence in support of their claims. Given that 
these theories involve competing or opposing claims, one 
is led to conclude that experimental evidence should not 
be treated as a final arbiter in an assessment of the valid-
ity of theories. It is perhaps appropriate at this point to 
move the debate onto non-empirical grounds”.
When referring to non-empirical grounds, Cummings 
means classical philosophy of language and pragmatics. 
What else, however, will help the discipline, and a touch 
of which is the topic of this paper, is the philosophy of 
empirical sciences. Empirical sciences could bring in a 
lot of valuable insight, not only concerning the issue of 
hypothesis formation and verification, but also, it could 
offer powerful ideas for structuring data.
The philosophy of science has a long tradition and 
it is impossible to discuss it all in one article. There are 
even no general definitions of such concepts as a theory, 
principle, law, hypothesis which would mean the same 
across all of its sub-disciplines. For an overview of the 
vast progress concerning the specificity and diversity of 
scientific explanation in biology, for instance, one might 
go to Braillard and Malaterre (2015), “Explanation in 
Biology”, or consider the contents of The Bio-linguistic 
Journal. The overview of Zipfian linguistics, on the other 
hand, will be found in the Journal of Quantitative Lin-
guistics and accompanying book series. Therefore, at this 
place I must start from selecting a specific perspective 
to see whether it could be relevant for language stud-
ies. I decided to limit myself to the theory of science as 
explicated by Bunge (1967, 1973, 1996, 1999, 2003), and 
constrained by Altmann’s (1978) assumption about self-
originating and self-regulatory character of language. 
Therefore, before proceeding further, first I shall outline 
Bunge’s (1973) view of the methodology of empirical 
sciences.
Scientific methodology: an overview
Amazing progress that has been taking place in every 
walk of life these days has its roots in the empirical para-
digm developed in natural sciences. The empirical para-
digm in natural sciences is based on researching material 
reality through building and testing its models. Models 
are created in order to explain the old and predict new 
characteristics and behaviour of a given fragment of the 
reality under study. Building a model of a given object, 
or process, involves selecting its most relevant features, 
given the aspects of that object, or process, we want to 
account for. For instance, in relation to modelling a flight 
of birds it means that an ornithologist interested in bird 
migration will consider different characteristics of a bird 
than a hunter who is concerned with estimating the place 
where a bird he has just shot will drop. The former will 
consider factors such as the characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which the given species can be found, its 
endurance and reproduction circle; while the latter will 
characterize a bird in terms of the parameters relevant in 
Newton’s dynamics—he will set out to estimate the force 
of the muscles and the mass of the bird at stake.
Scholars select the relevant features of an object under 
scrutiny based on what they know about it at a given 
stage of the development of a relevant discipline and 
based on their own intuition. In new disciplines such 
knowledge and experience is initially expressed in natural 
language. As a given discipline advances, the core of the 
respective knowledge is increasingly expressed through 
received formalized theories (systems of (mechanistic) 
universal laws, such as the laws of Newton’s dynamics) 
that express some general aspects of the mechanism 
sustaining the processes present in the class of phenom-
ena. These theories, not testable per se, let one formulate 
testable hypothesis (phenomenological laws) concern-
ing models of specific phenomena, or specific theories. 
(In the case of Newton’s dynamics such a specific theory 
could concern the movement of the Earth around the 
Sun). Importantly, the resultant testable hypotheses (phe-
nomenological laws), typically, are not implied solely by 
a given mechanistic law being tested, but also by some 
additional assumptions made while constructing the 
model of a given phenomenon. These additional assump-
tions are of two types. First, these are approximating 
assumptions, such as approximating Earth as a material 
point with a zero volume when modelling its movement 
around the Sun with the help of Newton’s laws. Second, 
there can be some additional, already well tested mech-
anistic laws that are also relied on when describing the 
specific theory to be tested.
In empirical sciences one says that a given phenom-
enon (its model, also called a specific theory) has been 
fully explained (corroborated and tested) when two 
conditions have been met. First, one has explicated the 
mechanism which brings about and/or sustains that 
phenomenon in terms of some mechanistic laws and the 
assumptions made when constructing the given model 
(specific theory). Second, the explication proposed 
implies some hypothesis, which can be and has been 
tested. Historically speaking, one begins with searching 
for empirical rules (also called phenomenological laws), 
which capture patterns in data (the way Kepler did, when 
he analysed the data collected by Tycho Brache, finding 
that the mathematical formula for ellipsis summarizes 
the observed positions of planets revolting around the 
Sun). Only later does one search for some mechanis-
tic laws, which (along with the assumptions made when 
constructing the given model) imply the respective 
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formulae—hypothesis. (This was what Newton did in 
relation to Kepler’s results). Yet, one may also begin with 
constructing a theory and next searching for a model 
(specific theory) that will imply some regularities which 
can be tested objectively.
Developmental and self‑regulatory character 
of language
Before proceeding further, in view of what has been said 
about the empirical paradigm, we need to stipulate some 
general characteristics of language as a phenomenon that 
could be studied as an empirical science. To this end, first 
of all let us note that for language studies to belong to 
empirical sciences, language must be treated as an aspect 
of a material system—it must be treated as a semiotic sys-
tem, which is a result of communication process taking 
place in the brains of linguistic community members. In 
other words, language is a socio-natural phenomenon. 
Therefore, empirical linguists will be interested in char-
acteristics of parole not langue. (It will consider langue 
only when preparing a descriptive framework.)
We may also note that given the structure and origin of 
human brains, which is a result of a long developmental 
self-organizing processes, conditioned by very specific 
environmental events, it is likely that language, an off-
spin of linguistic activity, becomes self-organized and 
self-regulated, too. The likelihood of that hypothesis has 
been corroborated by a number of the quantitative char-
acteristics of language, such as demonstrated by Zipf ’s, 
or Pareto’s laws, which characterize self-organizing and 
self-regulating phenomena. Altmann (1978) proposed 
that this self-organization and self-regularization of lan-
guage, is a result of optimization process in individual 
brains, which result from selection processes taking place 
in societies, aiming at some sort of economy of language 
use on the parts of speakers and listeners.1
Optimization processes with their source in the sum 
of individual verbal behaviours of a given linguistic com-
munity members, must in turn, depend strongly on the 
contingencies involved in the actual individual histories 
of language use (parole). Therefore, in empirical linguis-
tics carried out in the paradigm of empirical science 
as outlined by Bunge and based on Altmann’s (1978) 
1 Related principles have been known since Zipf (1949) (the principle 
of least effort) and advocated e.g. as the principle of the effective means 
by Kasher (1982, p. 32): ‘Given a desired end, one is to choose that action 
which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus’). 
What differs importantly Altmann’s proposition is that this need no longer 
be an individual, who is said to behave optimally, although in some respects 
he may, but the society. So according to Altmann, in the long run it is an 
average cost of a given solution for a given linguistic community that mat-
ters. This may be attained through optimal behavior of individuals, but need 
not.
hypothesis, only statistical laws and principles make 
sense—can be proposed, searched for, and tested objec-
tively cf. Grzybek (2006), Koehler (2012). Interestingly, 
language speakers are not always aware of such statistical 
patterns in language.
Linguistic principles in empirical linguistics as just 
delimited may concern either local or global processes. 
Local regularization processes in language may take 
place due to the capabilities of individual human brains 
alone. For instance, the ability to select the most alike 
option during categorization (thus to correlate referents 
with symbols) depends on the capabilities of an indi-
vidual speaker. This, as shown by Skousen (1989), may 
alone lead to some linguistic regularization, such as the 
regularization of past tens suffixes in Finish. After such a 
regularization, the resultant semiotic system is easier to 
remember and use, thus, more economic. Another well 
understood mechanism which economizes communica-
tion locally is shortening highly predictable lexemes. This 
process results in lowering the production effort practi-
cally without increasing the comprehension effort.
Yet, language seems to be also optimized globally to a 
significant extent as evidenced e.g., by implicational uni-
versals. In other words, some uneconomic solutions allow 
economizing some other aspects of language, which out-
weighs the loss in another aspect of language use. (For 
instance, having suffixes marking gender in Slavic lan-
guages, allows these languages to limit the usage of pro-
nouns, as well as to make word order more flexible thus 
produce cohesive discourse in a more economic fash-
ion.) Such cross-optimization could not have happened 
locally due to conscious effort of an individual speaker. 
In such a case natural selection-like mechanism, as pro-
posed by Altmann (1978), could have been involved—
language efficiency factor could have selected among 
early language varieties. In line with Altmann’s (ibidem) 
proposal, having reviewed research based on neural nets 
modelling, Kwapień (2010) found out, for instance, that 
OSV languages take considerably more time to learn 
than SVO and SOV languages, making them less effi-
cient. Another proposal of this sort is that, at least early 
on, people speaking a more efficient variety of a local lan-
guage (e.g., communicating faster, more precisely, using a 
language variety easier to imitate) were more successful 
in a given linguistic community, which, in turn, increased 
the exposition of their speech variety, resulting in the 
increase of its replication among the remaining commu-
nity members.
Before moving on to the next section, I would like to 
comment on the potential influence of the normativity 
on language formation, as brought up by a reviewer. The 
issue of normativity is a very complex one and a topic of 
a heated debate. For an overview see The Normativity of 
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Meaning and Content Stanford encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. One of the foundational issues related to normativ-
ity is parallel to that of basic encodings, which cannot 
be shared between different individuals. As far as basic 
encodings are concerned, the proposition of Bickhard 
and Campbell (1992) presented in a special issue of 
Journal of Pragmatics was groundbreaking in solving 
that latter problem. If one followed a similar reasoning, 
normativity would be a derivative of language forma-
tion mechanism, not its cause. Luckily, I do not need to 
discuss this extremely complex issue here, because as 
noted by the reviewer, “The example study given later by 
the Author escapes this issue, because adjectives can be 
exchanged in order without breaking linguistic norms.” 
So whatever stand we take as far as normativity is con-
cerned, we may safely skip discussing it here.
An example of an approach to linguistics 
as outlined by Mario Bunge and constrained 
by Gabriel Altmann
To recap, the foundational stage of any research requires 
a description of the phenomenon studied. Current main 
stream research in general linguistics, however, stops on 
that. Research in line with the methodology of empiri-
cal sciences can be of two types. The first type of activity 
consists in the search for statistical patterns (phenome-
nological laws). An excellent example of the application 
of the scientific method of this type to studying language 
are studies done by Héléne and André Włodarczyk at 
CELTA, Paris, using Semana software to categorize all 
sorts of linguistic data, cf. Włodarczyk (2007, 2009). 
Another significant research effort in this category has 
been led by Stefan Gries, the editor of Corpus Linguistics 
and Linguistic Theory. Numerous research in character-
izing quantitative aspects of linguistic data, all analysed 
in statistically rigorous manner, have been collected for 
years in Journal of Quantitative Linguistics edited by 
Reinhard Koehler. An interesting example of such stud-
ies, published in mainstream linguistic journals is Jary 
(2008).
Another way of doing empirical research consists in 
proposing principles implied by some properties of mate-
rial systems, which could account for the patterns already 
found in objectively measured data, or which could sug-
gest new patterns to look for. In case of linguistics, lin-
guistic research of this type consists in hypothesizing 
bio-cognitive and social principles, which can account 
for statistical patterns found in linguistic data, e.g. in lin-
guistic corpora, or which could imply some new patterns 
(phenomenological laws) to test. Royal Skousen, Gabriel 
Altmann, and Reinhard Koehler, have each proposed 
such an explanatory theory of language. Royal Skousen 
introduced Analogical Modelling. Altmann proposed 
Grand Unified Theory and Koehler—Synergetic Lin-
guistics. All three of these propositions are in line with 
Bunge’s (1967) perspective on empirical research, which 
position advocates the description of the world solely 
in terms of formalized theories implying phenomeno-
logical laws and treats models as temporary solutions 
for specific issues before general theories can be found. 
Such approaches, however, limit significantly the scope 
of which aspects of language can be modelled—it tack-
les only the aspects of the phenomena definable in full by 
formalized theories—and often result in formalizations, 
which are not particularly intuitive.
Yet, as already explained in “Scientific methodology: an 
overview” section, Bunge (1973) argues that models2 are 
indispensable at any stage of development of any disci-
pline, because they contain approximating conditions 
coming from beyond theories (we mentioned the approx-
imations involved in modelling the revolution of Earth 
around the Sun). Models of specific phenomena are nec-
essary to test theories, because theories postulate so gen-
eral characteristics of a class of phenomena, that there 
are not directly testable. This newer perspective pre-
sented in Bunge (1973) has two important consequences, 
a negative and a positive one. On one hand, if a test of a 
given model (empirical law) becomes falsified experi-
mentally, we cannot say what is wrong: the theory, or the 
simplifying approximations made when constructing the 
model. On the other hand, now more aspects of the phe-
nomena considered can be studied—also those whose 
modelling involves significant approximating condi-
tions—and, methodologically speaking, a given discipline 
is primarily partitioned into its aspects which correspond 
to models reflecting direct observations. Therefore, sin-
gling out models in a theoretical framework the way 
Bunge (1973) recommended results also in a more intui-
tive connection between the phenomenon described and 
a relevant statistical hypothesis. For an example of such 
an approach, see Zielinska (2007a, b, c, 2013, 2014).
While emphasizing the role of models in scientific 
endeavors, Bunge (1973) stresses also the value of quali-
tative theories when formalized theories are not avail-
able, and recommends applying qualitative theories to 
models, too. He does so because qualitative theories may 
imply some simpler and less restraining, yet scientifically 
sound hypotheses of the sort “the more of A, the more 
of B”, which, albeit less strongly, corroborate the respec-
tive theories. This is what I am going to show next when 
illustrating how qualitative linguistic laws (principles) 
can account for phenomenological laws (patterns) in 
2 A ‘model’ can be defined also as a “specific theory”, or else “theory with a 
rather narrow reference class”.
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linguistics in analogy to the way it is done in empirical 
sciences.
To show how qualitative linguistic laws (principles) can 
account for phenomenological laws (patterns) in linguis-
tics in analogy to the way it is done in empirical sciences, 
I shall present an account of a statistical preference in 
the order of certain categories of adjectives in Adjective, 
Adjective, Noun (AAN) phrases with the help of the pro-
cedural model of language presented in Zielinska (2007a, 
b, c,  2010, 2013, 2014). Procedural model of language 
(also called a field model of language) is a qualitative 
theory of form meaning-correlation in natural language 
based on two general assumptions: first, that language 
self-regulates because people keep replicating its more 
efficient varieties (of which latter fact, they need not be 
conscious) and second, that language change—a pre-
requisite for self-regulation—is possible because when 
using language, speakers categorize not only resorting to 
Aristotelian mechanism (encoding), but also to selective 
one—choosing the best match for the encoded item used 
for selection among options viable in a given situation.
In other words, according to the procedural model of 
language, linguistic items may serve either to encode, or 
to select, or both. For instance, the items red and rose 
encode red items and roses, respectively. But the item 
“red rose” typically does not so much encode an item that 
is both a rose and that is red, but it selects among roses, 
the one which is more red than other roses, thus point-
ing out a flower that consists primarily of a green stem 
and leaves and whose tiny part (the flower) has red pet-
als, (rather than white, yellow, or pink). Encodingly, a red 
rose should have a red stem and leaves, too. So selection 
takes part as if “outside-in”, to use Mey’s (2001) view. [See 
also Mey’s comments on procedural model of language in 
a footnote in Zielinska (2007c)]
So coming back to the order of adjectives in AAN 
phrases, it has long been known that in English there is a 
visible preference for placing adjectives representing the 
following semantic categories in that order: (measuring 
from the adjective the farthest from the noun) 1. “opin-
ion”, 2. “size”, 3. “shape”, 4. “age”, 5. “colour”, 6. “nationality”, 
7. “material”. A similar dependence between the following 
semantic categories and their distance from the noun: I. 
(opinion, size) II. (age colour), III. (nationality, material) 
has also been observed, for instance, in German, Viet-
namese, Chinese, Hungarian, Polish, and, with some res-
ervations in French, which suggests a universal cause for 
the phenomenon. A more modern approach to this issue 
is to analyse the dependence of the distance of a given 
adjective from the associated noun on some concept, 
which characterizes a given semantic category and which 
can be quantified. Next, one will search for the mecha-
nism that would account for the dependence observed. 
Two of such measurable factors influencing the distance 
between a given adjective and the associated noun turn 
out to be gradability and categoriability.
Gradable adjectives are the ones whose values typically 
strongly depend on the noun they modify: cf. the value 
of the lexeme big in the phrases a big star and a big virus, 
respectively. The degree of gradability of a given adjec-
tive can be defined quantitatively (operationalized) as 
the ratio of the number of occurrences of a given adjec-
tive in some corpus in comparative and superlative forms 
to all its occurrences in that corpus (cf. Wulf 2003). The 
first two semantic categories mentioned above, these of 
“opinion” and “size” seem to be the most gradable ones, 
while the categories of “origin” and “material” intuitively 
seem to be the least gradable. Consider for instance the 
phrases, a big child, and an American girl.
A categorizing adjective in an Adjective Noun phrase 
is the one that typically singles out a subcategory of the 
members of the category selected by a given noun, i.e., 
who share also some additional characteristics besides 
the ones referred to with the given adjective and the 
given noun. “A wooden bridge” for instance, is not only a 
bridge made of wood, but it has a certain kind of a struc-
ture characterized by a typical range of sizes and shapes. 
Operationalizing categoriability is not very straight for-
ward, but can be done, for instance, by calculating how 
often a given adjective accompanies a given noun in 
relation to accompanying any noun in a given corpus. 
Intuitively speaking, we may expect that the seman-
tic categories expressing “material” or “nationality” will 
tend to be strongly categorizing. Consider, for instance, 
the qualities of the following phrases: a Turkish carpet, a 
steel bed frame. Note, also that, in fact we are speaking 
about typical uses of some adjectives, rather than types of 
adjectives, because in some situated speech acts, a given 
lexeme can be used gradably, in others: categorizingly. 
Defining the degree of being gradable or categorizing, we 
state what usage is typical for a given lexeme.
In view of the above, the observed dependence of the 
order of adjectives in noun phrases on the semantic fac-
tors mentioned earlier can be substituted now by the 
following model. “The more categorizing and the less 
gradable a given adjective located in a Adj + Adj + Noun 
phrase is, the closer to the noun it is likely to be.”
I propose the following explanation (qualitative theory) 
for the observations just mentioned. Given the assump-
tions that language self-organizes and self-regulates due 
to speakers’ opting, consciously or not, for more efficient 
solutions, and that linguistic items are used not only to 
encode but also to select from sets of possibilities silent 
in the given situation (as assumed by the procedural 
model of language), the order of adjectives in noun 
phrases described above (the more categorizing and the 
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less gradable an adjective is, the closer it is placed to the 
noun) is favoured because it increases the efficiency of 
linguistic communication. The increase in linguistic effi-
ciency in the situation under discussion takes place at 
least for two reasons. The first reason is that placing a 
categorizing adjective first, i.e. further from the noun 
(thus, interpreting it last), and placing a gradable one sec-
ond, i.e., closer to the noun (thus, interpreting it first), 
increases the precision of the interpretation of a given 
A1A2N phrase. Since categorizing adjectives impose 
additional limitations on the subcategories they co-iden-
tify, they narrow down the range of the parameter values 
from which gradable nouns will be selecting. In other 
words, a gradable adjective (or even better, an adjective 
used gradably3) applied after a categorizing one, operates 
on a more exact scale defined by the parameters of a 
given subcategory than if it were applied first, i.e., to the 
whole category of the nouns defined solely by the given 
noun. For instance, “a long wooden bridge” will be typi-
cally significantly shorter than an average “long bridge” 
because these days bridges are typically made of rein-
forced concrete, or steel, and one may construct much 
longer bridges with steel, or reinforced concrete than 
with timber. So using the phrase a wooden long bridge 
would require re-evaluating the value of “long” after 
interpreting the lexeme wooden.
The second reason is that placing the gradable adjec-
tive closer to the noun could skew the resultant encoded 
value of the non-gradable adjective applied second 
(placed further away from the noun). If we assume that 
the encoded value of a given lexeme is a sort of average of 
its past uses, [as assumed e.g., in the procedural model of 
language (PML)], an atypical value of a particular usage 
of that lexeme skews its resultant coded meaning. Placing 
a gradable adjective next to the noun (applying it first), 
selects a subset of referents, which may well have atypi-
cal parameters. In this case, the non-gradable adjective 
applied second, which will be selecting its value from an 
atypical scale of options, may end up having assigned an 
atypical value. If this happens sufficiently often, the cur-
rent encoded value of that non-gradable adjective will 
become skewed. To illustrate the point, let me consider 
the meaning of red used in the phrase a red big bird. In 
Cracow zoo, this phrase will select a pelican, whose col-
our differs significantly from a prototypical red. There-
fore, if a given speaker keeps using that phrase in similar 
contexts, the encoded value of red will become altered 
3 Note that adjectives when used gradably, or categorizingly, do not encode 
content, but select it from a set of options, which phenomenon is postu-
lated by the procedural model of language. Procedural model of language 
postulates that all lexical categories, not only pronouns or demonstratives, 
can serve to select content in the context.
for him. On the other hand, since the values of grada-
ble adjectives each time depend on selected scales, their 
encoded meanings will always be “spread” no matter 
where they are placed and will always need to be used 
selectively—on a given scale. After all “a big virus” must 
be interpreted as a significantly smaller size than “a tiny 
star”, no matter what the average meaning of big is.
The hypothesis under discussion that gradable adjec-
tives tend to precede categorizing adjectives in AAN 
phrases (counting from the left), implied by the law 
postulated above, can be corroborated with linguistic 
data in the following ways. First, it can be corroborated 
qualitatively with the help of the classical observation 
mentioned at the beginning of this section. According 
to this observation, the categories of the adjectives most 
distant from the noun are these of “opinion” and “size”, 
whose meanings, as just explained, typically depend on 
the category of the referent they assess, thus are used 
gradably. The categories of adjectives placed the clos-
est to the noun, on the other hand, are these of “mate-
rial” and “nationality”, which, along with the noun they 
assess, often single out a subcategory sharing not only 
the encoded features of the given set of lexemes, cf. brass 
instruments, wooden instruments, Irish cheddar cheese, 
Turkish carpets, thus are used categorizingly.
A better way to argue for the hypothesis discussed 
would consist in using quantitative data from linguis-
tic corpora. This could be done, for instance, in the fol-
lowing way. The hypothesis that the order of adjectives, 
starting from the noun, (which reflects the order of their 
operation), goes: categorizing first and gradable second) 
implies the following. If we divide two semantic catego-
ries of adjectives, which typically follow each other (let 
us call these A and B), into a “more gradabe” and “less 
gradable” subcategories each—Am-grad and Aless-gradable, 
Bm-grad and Bless-grad—then the statistical dominance of 
the occurrence of the order Am-grad Bless-grad N over Bless-
grad Am-grad N in AAN phrases should be even stronger 
than the statistical dominance of the order of total cate-
gories ABN over BAN, which, in turn, should be stronger 
than the dominance of the order of Ales-grad Bm-gradN over 
that in Bless-gradAm-grad N categories. This hypothesis was 
indeed confirmed statistically using British National Cor-
pus by Zielinska (2007a, b, c) in relation to the categories 
“age” and “colour”. (She split the category {colour) into 
{dark, light, vivid, pale, and such} and {red, blue, yellow, 
green, black, violet, etc.} and the category “Age” into {old, 
young, elderly, new, etc.) and {centennial, yearly, annual, 
n-year old, etc.}). Interestingly, Zielinska (ibid.) found that 
while the category of “age” statistically precedes (count-
ing from the left) that of “colour”, the subcategory “less-
gradable age” follows the subcategory of “more-gradable 
colour”. The same way, Zielinska (2007a, b, c) showed 
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with quantitative data the dependence of the position of 
the given adjective in AAN phrases on its degree of being 
categorizing.
Finally, it is also possible to test the main hypothesis 
discussed in a purely formal way, without resorting to 
semantics. To this end, we propose to express the degree 
of gradability for a given adjective as the number of 
tokens of a given adjective used in a superlative or com-
parative case to the number of all occurrences of that 
adjective in the given corpus, following Wulf ’s (2003) 
formalization of the opposite concept—that of not being 
gradable (comparable). Wulf (2003) finds out in her study 
that the mean values of IndComp (independent from 
comparison index) for adjective1 (adjectives standing 
far away from the noun in AAN phrases) and adjective2 
(adjectives standing next to the noun in AAN phrases) 
differ highly significantly (p <  .001). In other words, the 
adjectives standing further from their head noun occur 
with more forms of degree than adjectives directly pre-
ceding the head noun. This translates directly into the 
statement that the adjectives standing further from the 
noun are more gradable, (in other words, are more often 
used selectively).
Wulf (ibidem) considered also a number of other fac-
tors which influence the position of specific adjectives 
in AAN phrases. Yet, she has not found any acceptable 
formalization of a factor which could guide one in pro-
posing an operazionionization of the degree of its being 
categorizing for a given adjective. What seems to be a 
good candidate for operazionionization of that concept, 
but has not been tested yet, is Average Mutual Informa-
tion (AMI). AMI can be defined for a given adjective Ai 
and Noun Nj in terms of some relevant frequencies of 
occurrence. What else could be considered as the oper-
azionionization of the degree of categoriability in the 
case of Polish language, is the ratio of the postpositional 
uses of a given adjective to all its uses in AN phrases in 
a linguistic corpus. (In Polish, when a single adjective 
is used in a noun phrase postpositionally, this adjective 
tends to indicate a subcategory, cf. barszcz czerwony, 
[borhsch red], is a type of soup made of beets, which is 
of crimson colour. Polish nouns used prepositionally, on 
the other hand, tend to convey the encoded value of the 
adjective. For instance, the adjective red in the phrase a 
red scarf indicates simply the colour of the scarf in ques-
tion. Yet, such ordering is not a grammatical rule for Pol-
ish, but a preference.)
Finally, note, that it follows from what has been said 
above that the categories which are neither often used 
gradably nor categorizingly will be placed in the mid-
dle between the two groups. And if an adjective is nei-
ther truly gradable, nor categorizing, in other words, it 
is not used selectively, it is used encodingly. So it means 
that the categories of “age” and “colour” are typically used 
encodingly, i.e., with a relatively stable meaning. This cor-
roborates our intuition.
Interestingly, language users are not aware of statistical 
correlation in language. Consider for instance the follow-
ing comment of another reviewer of this paper pertaining 
to the statistical pattern describing the order of adjectives 
in AN phrases.
I would like to see the evidence supporting this claim 
about the order of adjectives in English. I see no 
grounds for saying that English speakers prefer ‘five 
year old, white cat’ to ‘white, five year old cat.’
This objection does not undermine the claim I made, 
because my claim is statistical in nature. I do not claim 
that this preference concerns every instance of an AAN 
phrase. The statistical preference hypothesized was 
noticed first by Boilinger (1967), albeit he did not express 
them in statistical terms. With time, typical ordering of 
semantic categories in AAN phrases became a common 
stock knowledge presented in grammar books such as 
Greenbaum, Sidney, and Randolph Quirk. 1990. A stu-
dent’s grammar of the English language published by 
Longman in London, which are read by thousands of 
advanced ESL students all over the world. More recently, 
Bolinger’s observation was supported with quantitative 
corpus research by Wulf (2003) and (Zielinska 2007a, b, 
2014). Thus the reviewer’s comment shows how wrong a 
native speaker’s intuition, concerning statistical facts can 
be, even if that native speaker happens to be a famous 
philosopher of language.
A similar situation took place in Polish academic world. 
Despite the fact that, due to being non-native speakers of 
English, Poles are quite familiar with Bolinger’s research 
concerning English language presented in ESL books, 
the possibility of researching the ordering of adjec-
tives in Polish noun phrases was not entertained until 
proven by Zielińska (2007a, b, c). She showed a statisti-
cal preference in the order of three categories of Polish 
adjectives representing the categories 1 “highly gradable 
adjectives”, 2. “neither highly gradable, nor highly catego-
rizing”, 3. “highly categorizing”, which turned out to be 
represented by semantic categories defined by Bolinger’s 
combined categories: 1 “opinion and size” 2 “colour, age” 
and 3 “nationality and material” One reason that such a 
hypothesis in respect to Polish had not been entertained, 
could have been the fact that Polish language having a 
considerably free word order makes this proposal par-
ticularly counter-intuitive.
The role of statistical patterns in language is under-
estimated by many. The reviewer mentioned also said. 
“In “Developmental and self-regulatory character of 
language” section you make the claim that empirical 
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linguists will be interested in parole and not langue. I 
do not see the justification for that. The fact that English 
speakers use ‘knife and fork’ more often than ‘fork and 
knife’ is a fact about parole. The fact that both conjunc-
tions are meaningful and grammatical in English is a fact 
about langue. Both are descriptions of empirical, linguis-
tic facts.”
Well, if we treat language as a set of patterns and a list of 
vocabulary items with respective representations assigned 
to them, then the qualitative yes/no (grammatical/non 
grammatical) judgements are sufficient and it makes sense 
to say that parol is a matter of the usage of lange. Yet, if we 
treat language as an evolving system (mind you that Nica-
raguan sign language originated within about 10 yeas), 
a theory of language aiming at modelling change—the 
self-organization and self-regulation of language—must 
be more precise than yes/no (grammatical/ungrammati-
cal) judgements allow it. To model change, such a the-
ory needs to take into account the frequency of usage of 
specific patterns and then lange no longer is independ-
ent from parole. It can be treated only as some percept 
of parol—possibly a set of statistically dominant pat-
terns found in parol. In other words there is an ontologi-
cal difference between the two perspectives compared. 
Mine—concerns language as a self-organizing system and 
self-developing system subject to evolutionary processes, 
that represented by the reviewer—concerns language 
viewed as an unchangeable set of patterns.
By the way, in British National Corpus, there are 87 
knives and forks but also 4 forks and knives. One may 
choose to disregard these latter examples, as proponents 
of language as an abstract structure view recommend, 
just as well as one may disregard the fact that 20  % of 
people say in the train and not on the train. Yet, if one 
starts considering frequencies, they note that there are 
many features and correlations which can be expressed 
only by rankings or statistical preferences. As Altmann 
and Koehler point out in the Introduction to Quantita-
tive Linguistics, there are dependencies of homonymy 
of grammatical morphemes on their dispersion in their 
paradigm, the length or complexity of syntactic construc-
tions on their frequencies and on their ambiguity. “the 
dynamics of the flow of information in a text on its size, 
the probability of change of a sound on its articulatory 
difficulty … in short, in every field and on each level of 
linguistic analysis—lexicon, phonology, morphology, syn-
tax, text structure, semantics, pragmatics, dialectology, 
language change, psycho- and socio-linguistics, in prose 
and lyric poetry—phenomena of this kind are predomi-
nant. They are observed in every language in the world 
and at all times. Moreover, it can be shown that these 
properties of linguistic elements and their inter-relations 
abide by universal laws, which can be formulated in a 
strict mathematical way—in analogy to the laws of the 
well-known natural sciences. Emphasis has to be put on 
the fact that these laws are stochastic; they do not cap-
ture single cases (this would neither be expected nor 
possible), they rather predict the probabilities of certain 
events or certain conditions in a whole. It is easy to find 
counter-examples to any of the examples cited above. 
However, this does not mean that they contradict the 
corresponding laws. Divergences from a statistical aver-
age are not only admissible but even necessary—they are 
themselves determined with quantitative exactness. This 
situation is, in principle, not different from that in the 
natural sciences, where the old deterministic ideas have 
been disused since long and have been replaced by mod-
ern statistical/probabilistic models.”
Similarly, it would not be very useful to collect the 
information about the heights of 12-year olds without 
noting also how many children fall into which height 
range. Only if you collect such statistical information will 
you be able to find, for instance, the correlation between 
height and other factors, such as diet, or lung capacity, 
and propose hypothesis stipulating the impact of one 
characteristics on another. For instance, you may use 
such correlations to find out what is the norm for the 
capacity of one’s lungs given one’s age, height and weight. 
Departure from this average serves as a primarily indi-
cator of asthma. Of course you could limit yourself to 
enumerating possible height ranges of 12 year olds, their 
mass and lung capacities, and these is how biology and 
medicine started out. But significantly, these disciplines 
took the next step—embraced the scientific method—
which started the incredible progress in medicine we 
are observing today. Note that transition in emphasis 
has taken place without neglecting traditional, classifica-
tory work—describing newly found plants and new sick-
nesses, which is as important as it ever was.
Conclusion
Currently, an important transition is taking place in lin-
guistic methodology. What dominated in language stud-
ies (in general linguistics) so far, and still dominates 
today, is observing and describing individual sentences 
and utterances. Yet, nowadays, more, and more linguists 
and interdisciplinary scholars concerned with language 
are looking for solutions guided by the methodology used 
in empirical sciences. Therefore, it would be good to pre-
sent available solutions to work out the most appropriate 
ones for language studies. I started that debate here by 
considering the application of Mario Bunge’s (1973) per-
spective on empirical sciences. I would also like to men-
tion here that the philosophy of empirical sciences offers 
not only a way of organizing research, but also ideas on 
how to structure data. Since language is characterized 
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by emergent phenomena on every level, I built on Bunge 
(2003) when proposing a qualitative model of utterance 
interpretation in Zielinska (2013) [cf. Dlugosz 2000, 
2016].
By advocating empirical linguistics research, I do not 
mean to undermine the value of a traditional study of 
language and the power of human intuition. As is the 
case in biology, the two approaches to the study of lan-
guage should complement, rather than contradict, each 
other. The depth of treatment of indirect reports in 
Capone (2010, 2012, 2014), for instance, cannot be eas-
ily quantified today, yet I bet, it will guide some quanti-
tative research of the future—form grounds for novel, 
quantitative analysis. The other way round, the results 
of quantitative research can well serve to inform classi-
cal linguistic propositions. For instance, the Zipf kind of 
relationship describing the distribution of many types of 
linguistic data, characterizes most of self-organizing sys-
tems, indicating strongly that language is a self-organiz-
ing system, too. This in turn, lets one eliminate some, and 
support other theories of language.
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